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TRUTH, TRUTHS, "TRUTH," AND
"TRUTHS" IN THE LAW
SUSAN HAACK*

The best way to get a clear view of questions about truth-in the law
or anywhere else-is to start, not with debates over "modernism" versus
"post-modernism," and the whole dubious history of ideas they
presuppose, but with a few simple distinctions.
Truth is the property of being true, what it is to be true. Of the
umpteen competing philosophical theories of truth, the most plausible
are, in intent or in effect, generalizations of the Aristotelian Insight that
"to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true." These
theories explain truth without reference to what you or I or anyone
believes, without reference to culture, paradigm, or perspective. Some of
them, the various versions of the correspondence theory, turn the
emphatic adverb for which we reach when we say that p is true just in
case actually, really, infact, p, into serious metaphysics, construing truth
as a relation, structural or conventional, of propositions or statements to
23
facts or reality. Others, such as Tarski's semantic theory,' Ramsey's
11
"redundancy" theory, 4 and the contemporary deflationist, minimalist,
disquotationalist, and prosententialist theories that are their
descendants,5 don't require such an elaborate ontological apparatus.
Truths are the many and various propositions, beliefs, etc., which are
true, including: particular empirical claims, scientific theories, historical
propositions, mathematical theorems, logical principles, textual
interpretations, statements about what a person believes or wants or

1. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics Book IV, in THE METAPHYSICS 146, 201 (Hugh Tredennick
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1933).
2. For a survey of philosophical theories of truth, see SUSAN HAACK, PHILOSOPHY OF
LOGICS 86-134 (1978).
3. See Alfred Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of
Semantics (1944), in READINGS IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 52-84 (Herbert Feigl &
Wilfrid Sellars eds., 1949).
4. See FRANK PLUMPTON RAMSEY, ON TRUTH (Nicholas Rescher & Ulrich Majer eds.,
1991) (Papers from 1927-29) "Redundancy" is the usual, but rather misleading, label
given to Ramsey's theory.
5. For more on deflationist, minimalist, disquotationalist, etc., theories, see PAUL
HORWICH, TRUTH(1998); SCOTT SOAMES, UNDERSTANDING TRUTH 228-55 (1999).
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intends, about social roles and rules, etc. To say that a claim is true is not
to say that anyone, or everyone, believes it, but that things are as it says.
However, some claims are such that the relevant things-a person's
beliefs or intentions, a legal or grammatical rule-depend, in one way or
another, on us; and some are such that it makes sense to ascribe a truthvalue only relative to this or that community or social practice.
Moreover, not every sentence, not even every declarative sentence,
manages to express something true or false; some, for instance, are too
indeterminate in meaning to have a truth-value.
The effect of scare quotes is to turn an expression meaning "X"into
an expression meaning "so-called 'X'." So scare-quotes "truth," as
distinct from truth, is what is taken to be truth; and scare-quotes "truths,"
as distinct from truths, are claims, propositions, or beliefs, which are
taken to be truths-many of which are not really truths at all. We
humans, after all, are thoroughly fallible creatures. Even with the best
will in the world, finding out the truth can be hard work; and we are
often willing, even eager, to take pains to avoid discovering, or to cover
up, unpalatable truths.
The rhetoric of truth, moreover, can be used in nefarious ways.
Hence an important source of the idea that truth is merely a rhetorical or
political concept: the seductive, but crashingly invalid, argument I call
the "Passes-for Fallacy." 6 What passes for truth, the argument goes, is
often no such thing, but only what the powerful have managed to get
accepted as such; therefore the concept of truth is nothing but
ideological humbug. Stated plainly, this is not only obviously invalid,
but also in obvious danger of undermining itself. If, however, you don't
distinguish truth from scare-quotes "truth," or truths from scare-quotes
"truths," it can seem irresistible.
Nowadays, it seems, the Passes-for Fallacy is ubiquitous. Perhaps it is
rooted in the philosophies of Marx and Freud, in the idea of false
consciousness and the "hermeneutics of suspicion." It is enabled by
regimes of propaganda and, in our times, by the overwhelming flood of
information, and misinformation, which promotes first credulity and
then, as people realize they have been fooled, cynicism. For when it
becomes notorious that what are presented as truths are not really truths
at all-that Pravda is full of lies and propaganda, that the scientific
6. I first introduced this term in Knowledge and Propaganda:Reflections of an Old
Feminist, 60.4 PARTISAN REV. 556-64 (1993), reprinted in SUSAN HAACK, MANIFESTO
OF A PASSIONATE MODERATE: UNFASHIONABLE ESSAYS 123-36 (1998).
7. See PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 20-

36 (Denis Savage trans., 1970).
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breakthrough or miracle drug prematurely trumpeted in the press was no
such thing-people become increasingly distrustful of truth-claims,
increasingly reluctant to speak of truth without the precaution of
neutralizing quotation marks; until eventually, they lose confidence in
the very idea of truth, and formerly precautionary scare-quotes cease to
warn and begin to scoff: "'Truth?' Yeah, right!"

This can be exacerbated when it comes to questions specifically about
truth in the law, as we shall see. But first I need one more distinction:
between the ordinary factual claims at issue in legal disputes, and legal
claims. In practice, these are often intimately intertwined, but
conceptually they are different enough to need separate treatment.
"This bullet was fired from that gun." "His exposure to that chemical
promoted the plaintiffs cancer." "The defendant believed the victim
was about to kill him." "There was a stop sign at the intersection at the
time of the accident." Crucial as they are to justice, the factual claims at
issue in legal proceedings are usually straightforwardly true or else false,
and should cause no special unease about truth or objectivity. If they
sometimes do, perhaps it is the result in part of a confusion of what is
true with what is known or proven to be true, and in part of immersion in
the adversary system, which can give people the idea that there must
always be two sides to every question, that it is arrogance to suppose
that we can ever really know the truth, that there are always grounds for
doubt, that all we can do is give due consideration to rival "truths"which makes the Passes-for Fallacy even more seductive.
In the adversarial system a jury is asked to decide, on the basis of
evidence presented by competing advocates, whether guilt or liability
has been established to the required degree of proof. This is a very
special kind of inquiry into a very special kind of proposition; because it
is constrained not only by epistemological desiderata, but also by policy
considerations, by formal rules of evidence, and by the need to arrive at
a decision in a reasonably short time, its procedures are very different
from those of ordinary scientific or historical inquiry, or even
investigative journalism or detective work. But when inquiry generally
is assimilated to this very special case, the differences are obscured: the
exchange of ideas and mutual criticism which forward scientific or
historical inquiry are confused with the interactions of rival advocates
trying to persuade a jury, and even the distinction between inquiry and
advocacy may be blurred.
As for legal claims-claims to the effect that the law is thus and so-
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the first and most obvious thing to be said is that they make sense, and
hence can be true or false, only when construed as implicitly referring to
some legal system or systems (and to a time). "Novel scientific evidence
is admissible only if it is generally accepted in the field to which it
belongs," for exampleA is presently true in state courts in Florida, but
false in federal courts. Truth is not relative to a legal system, but legal
claims are. Moreover, legal systems-though certainly real, not fictions
or figments-are also, in a sense, socially constructed: they exist, and
are as they are, only because of our institutional practices. Legal claims
are made true or false by legislation or precedent; although, once made,
their truth-value is a matter to be discovered-or sometimes re-made
through persuasive reinterpretation.
For legal claims are subject to indeterminacies of meaning, and, as
with partially defined predicates or functions in logic or mathematics,
may be definitely correct or definitely incorrect only in some
applications. So, they are susceptible to truth-value gaps. Is Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 compatible or incompatible with the Frye test? There
was no true or false answer until 1993, when, making FRE 702 more
determinate, the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Rules superseded
Frye.9 And whether a legal claim is made true or made false is doubtless
often the result, in whole or in part, of political pressures or advocates'
rhetorical skills-as the Daubert court's reading of the Federal Rules as
requiring reliability as well as relevance may be attributable in part to
the influence of Peter Huber's rhetoric about the ubiquity of "junk
science" in tort cases.' 0 Truth is not a political or rhetorical concept; but
sometimes, when legal truths are brought into being, it is in part by
political or rhetorical means.
Statements to the effect that you ought (or ought not) to do such and
such have both legal and moral interpretations. When people describe
this law as good, that as bad, they may be advocating or criticizing it on
moral grounds-as with proponents, and opponents, of liberal abortion

8. The Frye test, requiring that novel scientific evidence, in order to be admissible, must

be generally accepted in the field to which it belongs, derives from Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587
(1993), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Rules of Evidence have superseded
the Frye test in federal trials. In Flanaganv. State, 625 So.2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993),
noting the U.S. Supreme Court's movement away from Frye, the Florida Supreme Court
reaffirmed Florida's reliance on the Frye test; and in Hadden v. State 690 So.2d 573, 577,
580 (Fla. 1997), the court again reaffirmed the Frye test, expanding on its rationale and
proper implementation.
9. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 ("They contend that the Frye test was superseded by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We agree.")(citation omitted).
10. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE INTHE COURTROOM (1991).
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laws, or of laws allowing same-sex marriage (or, no doubt, proponents,
and opponents, of the law in Oliver Cromwell's Commonwealth
prescribing the death penalty for persons convicted of adultery).
However, not all legal norms concern matters of any moral significance;
and those that do may be either good or bad from a moral point of view.
Propositions to the effect that you legally ought to do a certain thing are
logically independent of propositions to the effect that you morally
ought to do it.
Are moral claims true or false, or only, as some Logical Positivists
maintained, expressions of emotion? If they are true or false, are they
statements of the speaker's subjective preferences, or of something more
objective? Are they relative to culture or community, or absolute? If
they are true or false objectively and absolutely, does this require a
moral reality, perhaps a non-natural realm of moral facts? What should
the relation be of legal to moral norms? And what kind of "should" is
that? Fortunately, such deep and difficult questions bear only quite
obliquely on the issue before us; so I won't apologize for having no
better answer than: "Get back to me in five years when I've had time to
think."

11. See, e.g., ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC 102-120 (1936);
Charles Leslie Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, 46 MIND 14, 14-31
(1937); CHARLES LESLIE STEVENSON, ETHics AND LANGUAGE (1945).

